Equity measures can be used as working tools to explore management alternatives for :I \\ater qualit! system. Several example measures of equity are discussed which proved useful in suggesting nra m;inagsment programs, in identifying critical waste dischargers. in suggesting Lones for grouping dischargers. and for understanding given management programs. The example equity measures were eveluated far Dclaware Estuary data by using mathematical programing.
Decision makers faced with managing the quality of a waterway are faced with two questions: How much water quality d o they want? How are they going to get it? That is. what management program should be used to achieve the desired water quality? These two questions should be answered simultaneously, since the choice of management program determines cost, which in turn should affect the level of quality sought, and since the best management approach may vary for different quality levels.
Generally, a wide range of alternatives is available; there are usually several distinct quality levels and several different categories of management programs, including direct regulations, effluent charges, and subsidies to dischargers. Direct regulation programs, which are considered here, specify the allowable waste-loading rate for each discharger. This paper presents a method which uses measures o f equity for generating and evaluating alternative programs to be considered in the overall planning process.
Equity among dischargers has historically been a primary planning objective because of its importance in developing politically acceptable and implementable plans and because a major trade-off between equity and cost usually occurs. Johnson [I9671 has suggested two equity criteria for evaluating a water quality management program: ( I ) equals should be treated equally and (2) nonequals should be treated differently. All waste dischargers are equals in the sense that as a result of past management decisions they all discharge waste material, thereby decreasing water quality. Dischargers historically have been suspicious of attempts by an outside agency to differentiate among them. This discussion assumes that equity among dischargers is a state of 'fairness' as perceived by the dischargers and that any differentiation among them must be viewed as being 'fair' by the dischargers themselves. (This application of the equity criteria differs somewhat from that offered by Johnson [1967] . I t is intended only for existing dischargers for whom past management decisions were relatively unaffected by water quality factors.)
According to the first equity consideration. equal disCopyright @ I976 by the American Geophysical Union chargers must be treated equally. again. as the equality is perceived by the dischargers themselves. In the past. dischargers have viewed equal waste removal efficiencies as satisfying the equity condition for direct discharge control programs. Every discharger provides its fair share of waste removal. and in the spirit of a private market system each is left to d o so in the most efficient manner it can. In this paper it is assumed that all dischargers should be considered equals, except where the! agree to differentiate among themselves. Furthermore, it is assumed that the waste reduction efficiency is an acceptable measure of a discharger's 'share' of the overall waste reduction burden. Equity is assumed to be a state where equals among dischargers provide the same share or efficiency, while nonequals may provide different efficiencies. An inequity occurs when equf d I s must provide different efficiencies. The efficiency measure is used here only to demonstrate the use of equity models; other measures may easily be substituted.
I n addition to indicating individual cases where inequities occur, removal efficiencies can also be used as the basis of a measure for evaluating the overall level of equity, o r inequity, for a given management program. By using such an approach.
programs can be evaluated with regard to an equity measure as well as cost; quantitative trade-off relationships can be calculated and presented as standard trade-off curves. (For a discussion of trade-off evaluations in multiobjective water resources planning the reader is referred to Cohori and M a r k s [ 19731, who also list additional references.)
While equity itself is a very difficult objective to quantify, i t will be shown that measures of equit). as rough as they are. can be very useful 'working tools' for generating new nianagement alternatives and gaining a better understanding of the basic water quality system. Their use can aid the overall planning process by providing additional insight into the system behavior, leading to better and more creative decisions. It should be emphasized, however, that we propose to use the measures of equity as working tools to generate trade-offs: no attempt is made here to apply then1 in analyticall, determining the 'best' management program (h! esplicitly presenting the trade-off between cost and equity along with societal indifference curves).
.
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The equity measures approach will be demonstrated by using data for the Delaware Estuary [Graues et al.. 19701 . The water quality system examined includes 44 point discharges of oxygen-demanding wastes. The twofold planning problem is to determine the desired level of water quality, in terms of dissolved oxygen, and to develop a waste management program. In the following examples, one quality level, 3 mg/l of dissolved oxygen, was used to demonstrate the method for generating and examining alternative direct regulation programs. The process would. in practice, be repeated for each potential quality level.
REVIEW OF HISTORICAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
The least-cost program for meeting a given water quality standard can be found by solving a formulation like the following:
Minimize sum of costs number of dischargers: waste removal efficiency for jth discharger; waste removal cost function for j t h discharger; waste quality improvement at the ith water quality checkpoint per unit increase in el; required water quality improvement at ith checkpoint; lower limit on waste removal efficiencies.
The objective of this formulation is to minimize the sum of the waste removal costs for the N dischargers. The waste removal for each discharger is expressed as a removal efficiency e, which gives the percentage removal. The first set of constraints expresses the upper limit of 1.0 for each removal efficiency. The second set of constraints enforces a desired lower limit on the removal efficiencies. (For example, primary treatment or secondary treatment could be required for all dischargers.) The third set of constraints specifies the water quality improvement necessary for meeting the standard at each water quality checkpoint or at each reach. Many quality models can be written in the form of the linear equations given: examples of linear models of dissolved oxygen systems are given by Thomann [ 19635 For the Delaware Estuary example the least-cost program, found by using linear programing [ReVeNe et al., 1968;  Smith and Morris, i9691, costs 66.8 million dollars in present value form. The cost data are from Graues et al. [1970] , who used a discount rate of 44%. The important characteristic of this solution is that the required efficiencies, given in Table I , range The uniform treatment program resolves these inequities by adding a requirement that all waste dischargers provide the same removal efficiency. This condition would be equitable given the assumption that all dischargers are equals and given the criterion proposed by Johnson [ 19671 that equals should be treated equally.
The equity condition can be added to the mathematical formulation by simply adding a fourth set of constraints which requires all e, variables to equal the same variable s, the uniform treatment efficiency:
where s is an unknown uniform treatment efficiency.
For the Delaware Estuary this formulation had to be modified slightly t o account for the fact that some dischargers employed high initial treatment levels prior to regulation. The modification prohibits any discharger from decreasing treatment below this initial level and requires an increase of treatment if necessary to reach the value of s. The program, found by a simple search over s using a consecutive bisection approach, would cost $195 million, and the value of s would be 78%. This example demonstrates the extreme cost penalty, or cost trade-off, that is typical in achieving this type of equity condition. The uniform treatment program costs approximately three times as much as the least-cost program, as shown in Table 2 .
The Public Health Service Study [Water Pollution Control Administration, 19691 also identified a third management program, called the zoned uniform treatment program, where the dischargers are grouped into zones and uniform removal efficiencies are required within each zone. A zoned program can be viewed as being equitable if the dischargers agree to the differentiation among them. Zones are not necessarily geographical: groups could be determined by using any classification scheme. This zoning concept can be included in the mathematical formulation by replacing the fourth constraint set above with the new constraint set given below:
where s, is the uniform removal efficiency in zone z , J , is the set of dischargers j in zone z , and Z is the number of zones.
The zoned uniform treatment solution for the Delaware Estuary example costs $108 million and is described in Table 2 . The total cost is still much greater than that for the least-cost program, but it is much less than that for e uniform treatment program. This solution also illustrates the effect of the uniform treatment program. If the dischargers are divided into zones, the first and third zones require minimal treatment levels, while the second zone requires a treatment level which is higher but only slightly (in the third significant figure) greater than that required for the uniform treatment program. The uniform treatment program simply requires all dischargers in zones 1 and 3 to increase their treatment to the level required to prevent violation of water quality standards by zone 2 dischargers. The associated cost increase is the penalty paid for achieving the equity condition in the uniform treatment program. Also while less total wastes are discharged for the uniform program, there is no quality improvement at the critical stream points.
? USE OF MEASURES OF EQUITY
The least-cost solution is likely to produce inequities, as demonstrated by the widely varying reduction efficiencies in the solution given in Table I . The uniform treatment program, which alleviates these inequities, can be viewed as adding equity constraints to the least-cost program. The resulting total cost increase, or economic efficiency loss, can be viewed as the 'cost of equity.' While there may be small quality increases in some reaches, other reaches, of course, are at the critical level. If the dischargers agree to zoning, then zoned uniform treatment programs are also equitable: again, however, there is a cost of equity. For both programs the trade-off between economic efficiency and equity may be explored further by relaxing the equity constraints.
Several equity measures will be used to explore this tradeOff, the interactions between discharges and water quality, and new management approaches.
A Summed Deviations Equity Measure
A uniform treatment program includes an equity constraint requiring all efficiencies to be equal. If this constraint is relaxed, deviations from the average of the efficiencies are allowed. Such deviations violate the assumed conditions for equity and therefore decrease equity. The deviations can b e calculated and combined to form a measure for the equity loss. If it is assumed that equity decreases linearly with each deviation, then equity decreases as the sum of the deviations increases. For example, the least-cost solution, with a large sum of deviations, is very inequitable.
The trade-off between cost and the equity measure can be found by constraining cost and solving for the program that minimizes the sum of the absolute values of efficiency deviations. The problem can be formulated as:
Minimize sum of deviations The other variables are as defined above.
The first three constraint sets are as given before. The fourth constraint set defines the average efficiency e,,. The fifth constraint set gives the deviation ut or c, from the average efficiency for each discharger. The equations relax the uniform treatment constraints to allow a deviation from e,; u, represents a deviation below e,, and u, represents a deviation above e,. The sixth constraint limits the program cost.
The objective function is to minimize the sum of the deviations from the average efficiency. If the cost were alloued to be as great as that for the uniform treatment program, then all deviations would be driven to zero, and the result would be identical to the uniform treatment program. If C, were set equal to the least-cost value, then a least-cost solution with a large number of deviations would result. By varying C, between these two extreme values, any number of intermediate
solutions can be derived. As the value of C, is reduced, the number and magnitude of deviations increase. providing programs which are less costly than the uniform treatment program but which, of course, present an increasing number of inequities.
The above formulation can be solved by using linear programing where the cost functions are linear or piecewise linear and convex. The variables uj and u, would not both be in the optimal solutions, since their constraint coefficients are linearly dependent.
For the Delaware Estuary example, modifications were made in the formulation, since some dischargers have initial removal efficiencies higher than the uniform treatment level. Since deviations are viewed as deviations from a uniform treatment program, deviations from the average were calculated for dischargers that would be required to increase efficiency to meet a uniform treatment program. Deviations for other dischargers were calculated from their initial levels, which are higher than the uniform treatment program efficiency.
The example programs that give the trade-off between total cost and the sum of deviations are plotted in Figure I . The trade-off curve shows equity increasing on the abscissa and economic efficiency increasing on the ordinate. The most equitable program, the uniform treatment alternative, occurs where the sum of deviations equals zero. However, it is not very economically efficient. Cost efficiency improves and equity is lost in moving to the least-cost program. where the sum of deviations is greatest.
Two intermediate example points are indicated on the tradeoff curve. One of these points EX I indicates that the program cost can be reduced from $195 million to $150 million, a reduction representing 35% of the maximum possible cost savings, while the sum of deviations increases to only 0.26. The cost can be further reduced to $1 IO million at EX 2, a reduction representing approximately 67% of the maximum possible savings, while the sum of deviations increases to 0.65. The latter program is near the elbow of the curve, beyond which much greater deviations (inequities) result.
As is shown in Table 3 , the program corresponding to EX I has an average removal efficiency of 72% with only four deviations. The second point EX 2 has an average efficiency of 67% with only six deviations. In both cases only a small number of
Sum Of Devialnnr From Uniform Tnolmenl
Solution (Efficiency Units I Equily -I . Economic efficiency versus a summed deviations equity measure. The example solutions illustrate the trade-off between cost and an equity measure. This approach also provides a better understanding of the waste discharge-water quality system being evaluated by the planning agency. For the Delaware solutions it is observed that one individual discharger is critical in the sense that his removal efficiency remains high while the average efficiency drops and the total cost decreases in moving toward the least-cost solution. Once it is identified, this critical discharger might well warrant special study and consideration.
The same equity measure can be used to relax the equity constraints in the zoned uniform treatment program. The uniform removal efficiency constraint can be relaxed for each zone. deviations being allowed for. The sum of these deviations can be minimized, a very similar trade-off curve being produced. The curve for the Delaware example, shown in 
A Range Equity Measure
The deviation measure tends to produce programs with most removal efficiencies at the average level and a few values scattered above and below. If it is assumed that equity decreases significantly with extreme deviations, then it would be desirable to minimize the range of removal efficiencies. The range equity measure, given by the maximum efficiency minus the minimum efficiency, would be zero for a uniform treatment program but quite large for a least-cost program. By varying the cost between the values for these two programs, it would be possible to derive a trade-off curve as in the previous case. The range minimization problem can be formulated as follows:
Minimize range of efficiencies min z = emnx -e m l n subject to The first three constraints are the same as those given before. The fourth and fifth constraint sets define the maximum and minimum efficiencies, respectively. The sixth constraint is the cost constraint for which the right-hand side is varied. The objective is to minimize the range of efficiencies. The problem can be solved as before by using linear programing.
For the Delaware Estuary example it was necessary to modify the formulation to consider only removal efficiencies that increase above the initial value. This modification required several computer runs with the value of e m R x specified to lie within several collectively exhaustive limits.
The curve in Figure 3 shows the trade-off between cost efficiency and the range equity measure for the Delaware example. The abscissa and ordinate represent the equity measure and cost efficiency, respectively. For an increase in equity, the range measure decreases in value.
As is illustrated in Figure 3 , the uniform treatment program Cost can be reduced from $195 million to $150 million, while the range of removal efficiencies increases to 0.09. The efficiencies range from 0.7 to 0.79. All discharger efficiencies (except those that are initially higher) are equal to one of the two extremes; 28 are at the lower level, and seven are at the higher level. If the cost is constrained to $ I I O million, the The interesting characteristic of the range solutions is that the dischargers tend to be grouped at the maximum removal level and the minimum level. The group at the upper level might be considered critical dischargers in that their waste treatment is necessary or highly desirable from a cost effective point of view. The number of dischargers at the higher level tends to be much less than the number at the lower level. This equity measure might be useful in defining zones which are desirable (with regard to economic efficiency) for a zoning program. Also in each case the critical dischargers are identified, and new directions for determining management programs may be suggested. For this example it could be desirable to establish a uniform treatment program at the lower level and to subsidize additional waste removal at the higher level.
The range equity measure can be applied to the zoned uniform treatment program as well. Maximum and minimum removal efficiencies are determined in each zone, and the sum of the zone ranges can be minimized. Such a measure was also applied to the Delaware example. For the example solution, as the cost was reduced to $90 million, it was found that the sum of ranges was derived entirely from the second zone. The removal efficiencies in that zone varied from 0.70 to 0.79. with 20 dischargers at the higher level and six at the lower level. Again. a set of critical dischargers was identified. suggesting that a possible alternative program be sought.
Masiniuin EfJicieticj Equitj-Measure
I f it is assumed that equity is decreased greatly when one or several dischargers face relatively severe waste removal requirements in comparison to all other dischargers, it might be desirable to minimize the maximum removal efficiency emax. I f the cost is allowed to be greater than or equal to the uniform treatment program cost. then the maximum efficiency can be driven down to the uniform treatment level. However, as the cost is more tightly constrained, a higher e m R x is usually required. This problem can be formulated by eliminating e,,,,,, from the formulation for the range measure.
The trade-off curve for the Delaware Estuary example, given in Figure 4 . is very interesting. The minimum emAx is 0.9 when the program cost is constrained to be the least-cost value: however, emax can be decreased all the way to 0.78, approximately the uniform treatment level, by allowing the cost to increase to only approximately $90 million. At this point. a very pronounced elbow, any further increase in cost does not allow a significant decrease below what is essentially the uniform treatment program removal efficiency, 0.78. As the cost constraint is further relaxed, there is no significant decrease in the maximum removal efficiency; instead, the other dischargers are simply increased to this level in exchange for an insignificant decrease in emRx. This indicates that the uniform treatment solution is determined by one critical discharger, and the program requirement for a uniform level simply requires all other dischargers to provide large increases to reach this level. The other way to view this situation is that as the uniform treatment constraint is relaxed. many dischargers can reduce their treatment levels, allowing total cost to decrease from $195 to $90 million, while no discharger IS required to significantly increase his waste removal efficiency. This reduction represents approximately 82% of the maximum possible savings. This maximum efficiency equity surrogate demonstrates the effect of the uniform treatment constraint in this case.
This equity measure may also be useful in defining zones for use in a zone program. For the example solution each discharger in a distinct group of nine was among the last to increase the removal efficiency to the maximum level emRx as the total cost constraint was relaxed. This indicates that these dischargers could form a desirable zone (from the point of view of economic efficiency). Total cost can be significantly reduced by allowing these dischargers to remain at lower efficiency levels. The zone program evaluated did use this group of dischargers for zone 3. I t is interesting that this exact group was defined by using the equity measure.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper demonstrates that measures of equity can be used as working tools to examine a water quality system and to explore management alternatives. For the example system, new alternative management programs as well as suggestions for additional ones were presented. The tools presented were also useful in identifying critical waste dischargers, in suggesting zones for zone programs, and in understanding the basic relationships between discharges and water quality implied by given management programs, A deviations equity measure tends to produce alternate uniform treatment programs that require the same removal -efficiency for all but a few dischargers. These programs offer very large cost savings in comparison to the uniform treatment program and appear to involve only a small number of inequi, ties which perhaps could be satisfactorily resolved. This meas. ure also indicates critical dischargers for whom high or \ow removal levels are particularly efficient. These insights into the system behavior might lead to a uniquely acceptable and efficient program in any given case.
The range equity measure tends to produce programs with some dischargers grouped at a maximum removal level and the others at a minimum removal level. Those at the higher level are the critical dischargers from the point of view of meeting water quality standards and maintaining low costs. This infor. mation could be useful in defining an economically efficient zoned uniform treatment level.
The maximum efficiency equity measure produced a very pronounced elbow, leading to an interesting observation for the Delaware example. The uniform treatment program in this case is determined by one discharger, and there is only an insignificant decrease in his allowed treatment level, since all other dischargers are required to raise their treatment eficiencies to the uniform level. The total program cost can be reduced from $195 million to $90 million with n o significant increase in the required treatment for the critical discharger. This fact ,illustrates the insignificant trade-off between treatment by him and treatment by all the other dischargers. Attention is thus focused on the critical discharger in developing a management program which could be an equitable, implementable, and relatively economically efficient solution.
A thorough analysis of the water quality management alternatives and the associated costs is especially important, since cost is proving to be an important factor in implementing environmental programs. Equity measures provide one approach to evaluating water. air, and other environmental systems in developing cost effective as well as implementable management alternatives. The measures of equity used here were only examples, and one should be cautious about drawing conclusions about specific management programs on the basis of simplified linear models. It has been demonstrated, however, that the general approach of using the imperfect measures of equity can lead to insights which would improve policy making. A final and more general conclusion is that although systems analysis techniques may not be capable of directly producing the best policy decision, they are useful as working tools within a larger decision-making framework.
